Abstract-We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the system over time. Because of the presence of asymmetric information, each agent needs to form beliefs about other agents' private information. Therefore, the specification of the agents' beliefs along with their strategies is necessary to study the dynamic game. We use Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as our solution concept. A PBE consists of a pair of strategy profile and belief system. In a PBE, every agent's strategy should be a best response under the belief system, and the belief system depends on agents' strategy profile when there is signaling among agents. Therefore, the circular dependence between strategy profile and belief system makes it difficult to compute PBE. Using the common information among agents, we introduce a subclass of PBE called common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-PBE), and provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game. Such decomposition leads to a backward induction algorithm to compute CIB-PBE. We illustrate the sequential decomposition with an example of a multiple access broadcast game. We prove the existence of CIB-PBE for a subclass of dynamic games.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Motivation
S
TOCHASTIC dynamic games arise in many sociotechnological systems such as cyber-security systems, electronic commerce platforms, communication networks, etc. In all these systems, there are many strategic decision makers (agents). In dynamic games with symmetric information all the agents share the same information and each agent makes decisions anticipating other agents' strategies. This class of dynamic games has been extensively studied in the literature (see [1] - [5] and references therein). An appropriate solution concept for this class of games is sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE), which consists of a strategy profile of agents that must satisfy sequential rationality [1] , [2] . The common history in dynamic games with symmetric information can be utilized to provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game. The common history (or a function of it) serves as an information state and SPE can be computed through backward induction. Many instances of stochastic dynamic games involve asymmetric information, that is, agents have different information over time (such games are also called dynamic games of incomplete information in the game and economic theory literature). In communication networks, different nodes have access to different local observations of the network. In electronic commerce systems, each seller has private information about the quality of his product. In cyber-security systems, a defender can not directly detect the attacker's activities. In this situation, if an agent wants to assess the performance of any particular strategy, he needs to form beliefs (over time) about the other agents' private information that is relevant to his objective. Therefore, perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is an appropriate solution concept for this class of games. PBE consists of a pair of strategy profile and belief system for all agents that jointly must satisfy sequential rationality and consistency [1] , [2] . In games with asymmetric information a decomposition similar to that of games with symmetric information is not possible in general. This is because the evaluation of an agent's strategy depends, in general, on the agent's beliefs about all other agents' private information over time. Since private information increases with time, the space of beliefs on the agents' private information grows with time. As a result, sequential computation of equilibria for stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information is available only for special instances (see [6] - [16] and references therein).
In this paper, we consider a general model of a dynamic game with a finite number of agents/players in a system with asymmetric information. The information available to an agent at any time can be decomposed into common information and private information. Common information refers to the part of an agent's information that is known by all agents; private information includes the part of an agent's information that is known only by that agent. We define a class of PBE and provide a sequential decomposition of the game through an appropriate choice of information state using ideas from 0018-9286 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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the common information approach for decentralized decisionmaking, developed in [17] . The proposed equilibrium and the associated decomposition resemble Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), defined in [18] for dynamic games with symmetric information. Games with asymmetric information have been investigated in the economic literature within the context of repeated games of incomplete information (see [6] - [9] and references therein). A key feature of these games is the absence of dynamics. The problems investigated in [10] - [16] are the most closely related to our problem. The authors of [10] - [14] analyze zero-sum games with asymmetric information. The authors of [15] , [16] used a common information based methodology, inspired by [17] , to establish the concept of common information based Markov perfect equilibria, and to achieve a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game that leads to a backward induction algorithm that determines such equilibria. Our problem is different from those investigated in [10] - [16] for the following reasons. It is a nonzero-sum game, thus, it is different from the problems analyzed in [10] - [14] . Our approach to analyzing dynamic games with asymmetric information is similar to that of [15] , [16] ; the key difference between our problem and those in [15] and [16] is in the information structure. The information structure in [15] and [16] is such that the agents' common information based (CIB) beliefs are strategy-independent, therefore there is no signaling effect. This naturally leads to the concept of common information based Markov perfect equilibrium. In our problem the information structure is such that the CIB beliefs are strategy-dependent, thus signaling is present. In such a case, the specification of a belief system along with a strategy profile is necessary to analyze the dynamic game. Signaling is a key phenomenon present in stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information. Since it plays a fundamental role in the class of games we investigate in this paper, we discuss its nature and its role below. The discussion will allow us to clarify the nature of our problem, after we formulate it, and to contrast it with the existing literature, in particular [15] and [16] .
B. Signaling
In a dynamic game with asymmetric information, an agent's private information is not observed directly by other agents. Nevertheless, when an agent's strategy depends on his private information, part of this private information may be revealed/ transmitted through his actions. We call such a strategy a private strategy. When the revealed information from an agent's private strategy is "relevant" to other agents, the other agents utilize this information to make future decisions. This phenomenon is referred to as signaling in games [19] and in decentralized control [20] . When signaling occurs, agents' beliefs about the system's private information (which is defined to be the union of all agents' private information) depend on the agents' strategies (see [19] ). Signaling may occur in games with asymmetric information depending on the system dynamics, the agents' utilities and the information structure of the game. Below we identify game environments where signaling occurs, as well as environments where signaling does not occur.
To identify game environments where signaling occurs we need to precisely define what we mean by the statement: an agent's private information is "relevant" to other agents. For that matter we define the concepts of payoff relevant and payoff irrelevant information.
We call a variable (e.g. the system state, an observation, or an action) payoff relevant (respectively, payoff irrelevant) to an agent at time t if the agent's expected continuation utility at t directly depends on (respectively, does not depend on) this variable given any fixed realization of all other variables. 1 For instance, in a dynamic game with Markov dynamics where agents' utilities at each time only depend on the current states, the current states are payoff relevant and the history of previous states is payoff irrelevant.
There are four types of game environments depending on the payoff revelance of an agent's private information.
(a) Agent n's private information at t is payoff relevant to him at t and from t+1 on, but payoff irrelevant to other agents from t+1 on. In this game environment, agent n may use a private strategy at t because his private information is payoff relevant to him at t. Then, other agents can infer part of agent n's privation information at t based on agent n's action. Although this revealed private information is payoff irrelevant to other agents, they can use it to anticipate agent n's future actions since this information is payoff relevant to agent n's future utility. In this game environment, signaling from agent n to other agents occurs. (b) Agent n's private information at t is payoff irrelevant to him at t, and is payoff relevant to other agents from t+1 on. This class of games includes the classic cheap-talk game [22] . In this game environment, other agents form beliefs about agent n's private information at t because it is payoff relevant to them. By using a private strategy, agent n can affect other agents' beliefs about his private information, hence, affect other agents' future decisions. Signaling may occur in this situation if agent n can improve his future utility when he signals part of his private information through his actions (e.g. perfectly informative/separating equilibria in the cheap-talk game). There may be no signaling if by revealing part of his private information agent n does not increase his future utility (e.g. uninformative/pooling equilibria in the cheap-talk game). (c) Agent n's private information at t is payoff relevant to him at t, and payoff relevant to other agents from t + 1 on. This game environment has both effects discussed in the previous two environments. As a result, we may have signaling or no signaling from agent n, depending on whether or not he can improve his future utility by using a private strategy. Decentralized team problems are examples where signaling occurs, because signaling strategies can help the collaborating agents to achieve higher utilities (see [23] - [26] for examples of signaling strategies in decentralized team problems). Pooling equilibria in the classic two-step signaling game [19] is an example of no signaling.
(d) Agent n's private information at t is payoff irrelevant to all agents, including himself, from t + 1 on. In this game environment no signaling occurs. Even if agent n uses a private strategy at t, since his private information is payoff irrelevant from t + 1 on to all agents, no agent will incorporate it in their future decisions. 2 The model in [15] and [16] are examples of this situation where signaling of information does not occur.
When signaling occurs in a game, all agents' beliefs on the system's private information are strategy dependent. Furthermore, each agent's choice of (private) strategy is based on the above mentioned beliefs, as they allow him to evaluate the strategy's performance. This circular dependence between strategies and beliefs makes the computation of equilibria for dynamic games a challenging problem when signaling occurs. This is not the case for games with no signaling effects. In these games, the agents' beliefs are strategy-independent and the circular dependence between strategies and belief breaks. Then, one can directly determine the agents' beliefs first, and then, compute the equilibrium strategies via backward induction [15] , [16] .
C. Contribution
The key contributions of the paper are: (1) The introduction of a subclass of PBE called common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-PBE) for dynamic games with asymmetric information. A CIB-PBE consists of a pair of strategy profile and a belief system that are sequentially rational and consistent. (2) The sequential decomposition of stochastic dynamic games with the asymmetric information through an appropriate choice of information state. This decomposition provides a backward induction algorithm to find CIB-PBE for dynamic games where signaling occurs. The decomposition and the algorithm are illustrated by an example from multiple access communication. ( 3) The existence of CIB-PBE for a subclass of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information.
D. Organization
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model of dynamic games in Section II. In Section III, we define the solution concept for our model and compare it with that for the standard extensive game form. In Section IV, we introduce 2 If one of the agents incorporates the belief on this private information in his strategy from t + 1 on, all other agents may also incorporate it. The argument is similar to situation (b) since all other agents will anticipate about how this agent will act. We note that, agents can use such payoff irrelevant information as a coordination instrument, and therefore, expand their strategy space thereby resulting in additional equilibria. As an example, consider a repeated prisoner's dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring of actions [9, ch. 7] . The agents can form a punishment mechanism that results in new equilibria in addition to the repetition of the stage-game equilibrium. In general, the idea of such a punishment mechanism is used to proof different versions of folk theorem for different setups [9] . However, we do not call this kind of cases signaling because the signals or actions of an agent serves only as a coordination instrument instead of transmitting private information form one agent to other agents. the concept of CIB-PBE and provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game. In Section V, we provide an example of a multiple access broadcast game that illustrates the results of Section IV. We prove the existence of CIB-PBE for a subclass of dynamic games in Section VI. We conclude in Section VII. The proofs of all of our technical results appear in the Appendix.
E. Notation
Random variables are denoted by upper case letters, their realization by the corresponding lower case letter. In general, subscripts are used as time index while superscripts are used to index agents. For time indices t 1 ≤ t 2 , X t 1 :t 2 (resp. f t 1 :t 2 (·)) is the short hand notation for the variables (X t 1 , X t 1 +1 , . . . , X t 2 ) (resp. functions (f t 1 (·), . . . , f t 2 (·))). When we consider the variables (resp. functions) for all time, we drop the subscript and use X to denote
to denote the vector of the set of variables (resp. functions) at t, and X
) to denote all the variables (resp. functions) at t except that of the agent indexed by n. P(·) and E(·) denote the probability and expectation of an event and a random variable, respectively. For a set X , Δ(X ) denotes the set of all beliefs/distributions on X . For random variables X, Y with realizations x, y, P(x|y) := P(X = x|Y = y) and E(X|y) := E(X|Y = y). For a strategy g and a belief (probability distribution) π, we use P g π (·) (resp. E g π (·)) to indicate that the probability (resp. expectation) depends on the choice of g and π. We use 1 {x} (y) to denote the indicator that X = x is in the event {Y = y}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a dynamic game among N strategic agents, indexed by N := {1, 2, . . . , N}, in a system over time horizon T := {1, 2, . . . , T }. Each agent n ∈ N is affiliated with a subsystem n. At every time t ∈ T , the state of the system (C t , X t ) has two components: C t ∈ C t denotes the public state, and
where X n t denotes the local state of subsystem n, n ∈ N . The public state C t is commonly observed by every agent, and the local state X n t is privately observed by agent n, n ∈ N . At time t, each agent n simultaneously selects an action A 
where random variables W 
and W n,Y t denotes the observation noise. The functions n t , n ∈ N , t ∈ T , are common information among all agents.
From the system dynamics (2) and the observations model (3), we define, for any n ∈ N , t ∈ T , the probabilities p
We assume that C t , X n t , A n t , and Y n t are finite sets for all n ∈ N , for all t ∈ T , and are common information among all agents. 3 We also assume that the primitive random variables
The actions A t and the observations
are observed by every agent. Therefore, at time t, all agents have access to the common history H c t defined to be
Including private information, the history H n t of agent n's information, n ∈ N , at t is given by
Let H c t denote the set of all possible common histories at time t ∈ T , and H n t denote the set of all possible information histories for agent n ∈ N at time t ∈ T .
Define
c t } to be the history of states and observations of the whole system up to time t. The hirtory H t captures the system evolution up to time t.
A behavioral strategy of agent n, n ∈ N , is defined as a map g
The choice of strategy g n t is agent n's private information. Let G n t denote the set of all possible behavioral strategies 4 g n t of agent n ∈ N at time t ∈ T .
At each time t ∈ T , agent n, n ∈ N , has a utility
that depends on the state of the system at t, including the public state and all local states, and the actions taken at t by all agents. The functions φ n t , n ∈ N , t ∈ T , are common information among all agents.
. . , g N ) denote the strategy profile of all agents, where
. Then, the total expected utility of agent n is given by
Each agent wishes to maximize his total expected utility. The problem defined above is a stochastic dynamic game with asymmetric information. The common history H c t , system dynamics, and agents' functional forms of their utility, given by (1)- (3) and (9), respectively, are common information among all agents; the local state X n t and the strategy choice g n t is agent n's private information.
As discussed above, signaling may occur in games of asymmetric information. The game instances that can be captured by our model could belong to any of the four game environments (a)-(d) described in Section I.
III. SOLUTION CONCEPT
For non-cooperative static games with complete information (resp. incomplete information), one can use Nash equilibrium (resp. Bayesian Nash equilibrium) as a solution concept. A strategy profile g = (g 1 , . . . , g N ) is a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium, if there in no agent n that can unilaterally deviate to another strategy g n and get a higher expected utility. One can use (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium to analyze dynamic stochastic games. However, the (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium solution concept ignores the dynamic nature of the system and only requires optimality with respect to any unilateral deviation from the equilibrium g at the beginning of the game (time 1). Requiring optimality only against unilateral deviation at time 1 could lead to irrational situations such as non-credible threats [1] , [2] . In dynamic games, a desirable equilibrium g should guarantee that there is no profitable unilateral deviation for any agent at any stage of the game. That is, for any t ∈ T , for any realization h t ∈ H t of the system evolution, the strategy g t:T = (g
T ) must be a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of the continuation game that follows h t . This requirement is called sequential rationality [1] , [2] .
In this paper we study dynamic stochastic games of incomplete asymmetric information. At time t, the system evolution H t is not completely known to all agents; each agent n ∈ N only observes H n t and has to form a belief about the complete system evolution H t up to time t. The belief that agent n forms about H t depends in general on both H n t and g −n 1:t . Knowing the strategy of the other agents, agent n can make inference about other agents' private information X −n 1:t from observing their actions. As pointed out in Section I, this phenomenon is called signaling in games with asymmetric information. Signaling results in agents' beliefs that depend on the strategy profile g (see the discussion in Section I). Therefore, at an equilibrium such beliefs must be consistent with the equilibrium strategies via Bayes' rule. Moreover, the sequential rationality requirement must be satisfied with respect to the agents' beliefs. We call the collection of all agents' beliefs at all times a belief system. A pair of strategy profile and belief system that are mutually sequentially rational and consistent form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). We use PBE as the solution concept in this paper to study the dynamic game defined in Section II.
We note that the system model we use in this paper is different from the standard model of extensive game form used in the game theory literatures [1] , [2] . Specifically, the model of Section II is a state space model (that describes the stochastic dynamics of the system), while the extensive game form is based on the intrinsic model [27] whose components are nature's moves and users' actions. The two models are equivalent within the context of sequential dynamic teams [28] . In order to analyze the dynamic game of the state space model of Section II, we need to provide the formal definition of PBE for our model in the following.
A. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
To provide a formal definition of PBE for our state space model defined in Section II, we first define histories of states, beliefs and signaling-free beliefs on histories of states.
Definition 1 (History of States) : The history of states at each time t is defined to be X 1:t .
Note that the history of states contains the trajectory of local state X n 1:t that is private information of agent n, n ∈ N . Definition 2 (Belief System): Let μ n t : H n t → Δ(X 1:t ). For every history h n t ∈ H n t , the map μ n t defines a belief for agent n ∈N at time t ∈T which is a probability distribution on the histories of states X 1:t . The collection of maps μ := {μ n t , n ∈ N , t ∈ T } is called a belief system on histories of states.
That is, given a belief system μ, agent n ∈ N assigns the probability distribution μ n t (h n t ) on X 1:t conditioning on the realized history of observations h
Then, given the beliefs μ
n t and a strategy g t at t ∈ T , when agent n takes an action a n t ∈ A n t , his belief about the system following (h n t , a n t ) is given by P g t μ (x 1:t+1 , y t , a t |h n t , a n t ) for any x 1:t+1 ∈ X 1:t+1 , y t ∈ Y t , a t ∈ A t , where
Definition 3 (Signaling-Free Beliefs): The signaling-free belief systemμ := {μ n t : C n t → Δ(X 1:t ), n ∈ N , t ∈ T } is defined on histories of states such that for each n ∈ N , t ∈ T , and h n t := (x n 1:t , c 1:t , a 1:t−1 , y 1:t−1 ) ∈ H n t μ n t (h n t ) (x 1:t ) := P (A 1:t−1 =a 1:t−1 ) (x 1:t |y 1:t−1 , x n 1:t ) for any x 1:t ∈ X 1:t .
The right hand side of (13) gives the conditional probability of {X 1:t = x 1:t } given {Y 1:t−1 = y 1:t−1 , X n 1:t = x n 1:t } when A 1:t−1 = a 1:t−1 . This conditional probability is computed using the realization h n t of agent n's information, the subsystem dynamics (2) , and the observation model (3).
Note that the signaling-free beliefμ n t (h n t ) is strategyindependent. One can thinkμ n t (h n t ) as the belief generated by the open-loop strategy (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t−1 ), so there is no signaling and strategy-dependent inference present in the belief system. The role of signaling-free belief will become evident when we talk about consistency in the definition of PBE for the state space model described in Section II.
The beliefs defined above are used by the agents to evaluate the performance of their strategies. Sequential rationality requires that at any time instant, each agent's strategy is his best response under his belief about the system states.
This relation between a strategy profile g and a belief system μ is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Sequential Rationality): A pair (g, μ) satisfies sequential rationality if for every n ∈ N , g n t:T is a solution to
for every t ∈ T and every history h
is computed using the probability measure generated from (11), (12) using the belief system μ and the strategy profile (g
given the realization h n t . The above definition of sequential rationality does not place any restriction on the belief system. However, rational agents should form their beliefs based on the strategies used by other agents. This consistency requirement is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Consistency): A pair (g, μ) satisfies consistency if μ can be computed by Bayes' rule whenever possible. That is, for n ∈ N , t ∈ T , such that P
, y t ,a t |h n t ,a n t for any x 1:t+1 ∈ X 1:t+1 (15) where P g t μ (·|h n t , a n t ) is the probability measure given by (12) . Furthermore, when P g μ (y t , a t |h n t , a
Note that the signaling-free belief systemμ is used in (16) of the definition for consistency. We will explain in the discussion below the importance of signaling-free beliefs on agents' rational behavior.
Using the above definitions, we define PBE for the stochastic dynamic game with asymmetric information described by the model of Section II.
Definition 6 (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium): A pair (g, μ) is called a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) if it satisfies sequential rationality and consistency.
B. Discussion
As we mentioned earlier, the state space model and the extensive game form are different but equivalent representations of sequential dynamic teams. We discuss the connection between these two models for dynamic games. The table below summarizes the key components of our state space model and the extensive game form (see [1] , [2] ).
The state variable X t in the state space model allows us to easily describe the system dynamics by (2) . Without an explicit state variable in the extensive form, it may be complex to describe and analyze the system dynamics. In the state space model, the system's evolution is captured by the history of states and observations H t . This is the analogue of the history of (agents' and nature's) actions in the extensive game form that captures the game's evolution trajectory. The history of information H n t defined in the state space model includes all information available to agent n at time t. This history determines what agent n knows about the system, and is the analogue of an information set in the extensive game form. Similarly, agent n's belief on histories of states (conditional on H n t ) in the state space model is the analogue of agent n's belief over an information set in the extensive game form.
Generally, a belief μ n t (h n t )(x 1:t ) can have a fixed support that includes the entire state space X 1:t . However, a belief on an information set has a variable support that includes nodes in that particular information set. Given a strategy profile, one can determine the belief using the Bayes' rule, given by (15), whenever possible for our state space model and (similarly) for the extensive game form model. However, when the denominator is zero in (15), or we reach an information set of measure zero in the extensive game form, one needs to assign values for the belief on X 1:t and on the nodes of the information set. In the extensive game form, the consistency condition allows for any arbitrary probability distribution over the nodes of the (reached) information set of measure zero. However, in our state space model we need to make sure that the belief assigned is consistent with the dynamics of the system. As a result, the belief does not necessarily assign a positive probability to a history of states and must be more carefully defined. This is where signaling-free beliefs play an important role.
To establish the equivalence between the belief μ n t (h n t )(x 1:t ) in our state space model and the belief on the information set of the corresponding extensive game form, we introduce the signaling-free beliefs. The signaling-free belief μ n t (h n t )(x 1:t ) defined by (13) for h n t = (x n 1:t , c 1:t , a 1:t−1 , y 1:t−1 ) is constructed by actions A 1:t−1 = a 1:t−1 conditioned on the history of observations y 1:t−1 , x n 1:t using the system dynamics. In forming a signaling-free belief no underlying strategy profile is assumed, and we do not make any further inference by tracing back how the observed actions are generated (i.e. the observed actions are generated by an open loop strategy). Therefore, if a history of states x 1:t does not belong to the support of the signaling-free belief (i.e.μ n t (h n t )(x 1:t ) = 0), this history of states x 1:t can not happen under any possible strategy profile. A rational agent should not assign positive probability on any history of states that is outside the support of the signaling-free belief. This leads to the second part of the consistency requirement (16) . With this additional requirement, the definition of consistency in our state space model is the analogue of the consistency in the extensive game form, and the definitions of PBE in the two models become identical.
We note that the signaling-free beliefs are strategyindependent. In systems where any agent's belief on system's states is strategy-independent (e.g. the finite games considered in [15] and linear-Gaussian systems [16] ), one can show that for any strategy profile g, the only consistent belief system is the signaling-free belief systemμ. In this type of systems, consistency is trivially satisfied using the signaling-free belief system μ. As a result, it is sufficient to verify sequential rationality to establish a PBE for systems with strategy-independent beliefs.
IV. COMMON INFORMATION BASED PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA AND SEQUENTIAL DECOMPOSITION
In this section, we introduce the common information based (CIB) belief system and CIB beliefs. The CIB beliefs generally depend on the agents' strategies because of the presence of signaling in dynamic games with asymmetric information. We use CIB beliefs to construct CIB strategy profiles for the agents. Using the concept of CIB belief system and CIB strategy profile, we define a subclass of PBE called common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-PBE). The main result of this section provides a sequential decomposition for the dynamic game model in Section II; this decomposition leads to a backward induction algorithm to compute CIB-PBE.
A. Preliminaries
Based on common histories, we first define CIB signalingfree belief system Definition 7 (CIB Signaling-Free Belief System): The CIB signaling-free belief system isγ := {γ t : H c t → Δ(X t ), t ∈T } where for each t ∈T and h c t = (c 1:t , a 1:t−1 , y 1:
The right hand side of (17) is interpreted in the same way as the right hand side of (13) 
for any n ∈ N . We useΠ t :=γ t (H c t ) to denote the CIB signaling-free belief at time t. Similar to signaling-free beliefs on histories of states defined in (13), the CIB signaling-free beliefΠ t depends only on the system dynamics and the observation model.
The CIB signaling-free beliefs have the following dynamics.
Lemma 1 (Evolution of CIB Signaling-Free Beliefs):
The CIB signaling-free beliefs {Π t , t ∈ T } can be updated bŷ
:=
Similar to the belief system defined in Section II, we need a belief system to form an equilibrium. We define CIB belief systems based on the agents' common histories together with CIB update rules.
Definition 8 (CIB Belief System and CIB Update
Rule): A collection of maps γ := {γ t : H c t → Δ(X t ), t ∈ T } is called a CIB belief system. A set of belief update functions ψ = {ψ
, n ∈ N , t ∈ T } is called a CIB update rule. From any CIB update rule ψ, we can construct a CIB belief system γ ψ by the following inductive construction:
x n t+1 (22) for every history h 
We also define the marginal beliefs on X n t at time t as
Since the CIB beliefs {Π γ ψ t , t ∈ T } are common information to all agents, all agents can use Π γ ψ t to evaluate the performance of their strategies. Furthermore, if a CIB update rule ψ is properly chosen, the CIB signaling-free beliefΠ t and the CIB belief Π γ ψ t together can summarize the agents' common knowledge about the current system states X t from all previous actions A 1:t−1 and observations Y 1:t−1 available to all of them at time t. This motivates the concept of CIB strategies defined below.
Definition 9 (CIB Strategy Profile) : We call a set of functions λ = {λ
, n ∈ N , t ∈ T } a CIB strategy profile. For notational simplicity, let B t := C t ×Δ(X t ) × Δ(X t ) and
denote the realization of the part of common information used in a CIB strategy. If agent n uses a CIB strategy λ n t , then any action a n t ∈ A n t is taken by agent n at time t with probability λ
Note that the domain X n t × B t of a CIB strategy λ n t is different from the domain H n t of a behavioral strategy g n t . However, given a CIB strategy profile λ and a CIB update rule ψ, we can construct a behavioral strategy profile g ∈ G by
In the following we provide a definition of a CIB belief system consistent with a CIB strategy profile.
Definition 10 (Consistency): For a given CIB strategy λ n t of user n ∈ N at t ∈ T , we call a belief update function ψ n t consistent with λ n t if (27) below is satisfied when the denominator of (27) is non-zero
where
When the denominator of (27) is zero
For any t ∈ T , if ψ n t is consistent with λ n t for all n ∈ N , we call ψ t consistent with λ t . If ψ t is consistent with λ t for all t ∈ T , we call the CIB update rule ψ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ T ) consistent with the CIB strategy profile λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ T ).
Remark 1: Note that when the denominator of (27) is zero, ψ n t (b t , a t , y n t ) can be arbitrarily defined as a probability distribution in Δ(X t+1 ) satisfying (29) and consistency still holds. One simple choice is to set ψ n t (y n t , a t , b t ) =ψ n t (y n t , a t ,π t ) when the denominator of (27) is zero; this choice trivially satisfies (29) . Thus, for any CIB strategy profile λ, there always exists at least a CIB update rule that is consistent with λ.
The following lemma establishes the relation between the consistency conditions given by Definition 5 and 10.
Lemma 2: If λ is a CIB strategy profile along with its consistent CIB update rule ψ, there exists a pair, denoted by (g, μ) = f (λ, ψ), such that g is the strategy profile constructed by (26) from (λ, ψ), and μ is a belief system consistent with the strategy profile g. Furthermore, for all h
t . Lemma 2 implies that using a CIB strategy profile λ along with its consistent update rule ψ we can construct a behavioral strategy profile g along with its consistent belief system μ.
Note that, (30) in Lemma 2 implies that for any agent n, his local states X n 1:t are independent of X −n 1:t under μ conditional on any history h n t ∈ H n t . Furthermore, the conditional independence described by (30) still holds even when agent n uses another strategy since the right hand side of (30) depends only on the CIB update rule ψ. This fact is made precise in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Conditional Independence): Suppose λ is a CIB strategy profile and ψ is a CIB update rule consistent with λ. Let (g, μ) = f (λ, ψ). If every agent k = n uses the strategy g k along with the belief system μ, then under any policy g n of agent n, agent n's belief about the states X 1:t for h n t ∈ C n t is given by
According to Lemma 3, for any (g, μ) = f (λ, ψ) generated from Lemma 2, we use 
B. Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
Based on the concept of CIB beliefs and CIB strategies, we focus on CIB-PBE defined below. The following lemma plays a crucial role in establishing the main results of this paper.
Lemma 4 (Closeness of CIB Strategies): Suppose λ is a CIB strategy profile and ψ is a CIB update rule consistent with λ. If every agent k = n uses the CIB strategy λ k along with the belief generated by ψ, then, there exists a CIB strategy λ n that is a best response for agent n under the belief generated by ψ at every history h n t ∈ H n t for all t ∈ T . Lemma 4 says that the set of CIB strategies is closed under the best response mapping. Since sequential rationality (Definition 4) requires a strategy profile to be a fixed point under the best response mapping [see (14) ], Lemma 4 allows us to restrict attention to the set of CIB strategies to find a fixed point and to search for CIB-PBE.
Below we provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game of Section II that enables us to sequentially compute CIB-PBE via dynamic programming.
In order to sequentially compute CIB-PBE we define a stage game for each time t ∈ T as follows.
Definition 12 (Stage Game G t ): Given a set of functions V t+1 = {V n t+1 : X n t × B t → R, n ∈ N } and a belief update function ψ t , for any realization b t = (c t , π t ,π t ) ∈ B t we define the following Bayesian game G t (V t+1 , ψ t , b t ) .
• There are N players indexed by N .
• Each player n ∈ N observes private information X n t ∈ X n t ; b t = (c t , π t ,π t ) are common information.
• X t = (X 1 t , . . . , X N t ) has a prior distribution π t .
• Each player n ∈ N selects an action A n t ∈ A n t .
• Each player n ∈ N has utility
If for each t ∈ T , the functions V t+1 are associated with the agents' future utilities, the Bayesian game G t (V t+1 , ψ t , b t ) becomes a stage game at t of the original game defined in Section II. Therefore, we consider Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of the game G t (V t+1 , ψ t , b t ) . For all V t+1 and ψ t , we define, the BNE correspondence as follows Definition 13 (BNE Correspondence):
If
, then for all n ∈ N and any realization x n t ∈ X n t , any a
Similar to the dynamic program in stochastic control, for each time t ∈ T we define the value update function D n t (V t+1 , λ t , ψ t ) for each n ∈ N .
Definition 14 (Value Update Function):
Using the concept of stage games and value update functions, we provide a dynamic programming method to sequentially compute CIB-PBE in the following theorem. 
ψ * t is consistent with λ * t (41)
Note that, from the dynamic program, the value function (c 1 , π 1 , π 1 ) ) at time t = 1 gives agent n's expected utility corresponding to the CIB-PBE (λ * , ψ * ) conditional on his private information X n 1 = x n 1 and public state C 1 = c 1 when the prior distribution of X 1 is π 1 .
Using Theorem 1, we can compute CIB-PBE of the dynamic game. The following algorithm uses backward induction to compute CIB-PBE based on Theorem 1.
Note that in line 5, for different (λ *
in line 5 of Algorithm 1 requires solving a fixed point problem to get a BNE along with a consistent belief system. The complexity for this step is the same as the complexity of finding a PBE for a two-stage dynamic game.
Algorithm 1 Backward Induction for Computing
Construct the stage game
for every n ∈ N do 7:
10: end for 11: end for 12:
Remark 2: As pointed out in Section III-B,π t is needed for the update of π t [See (27) - (29)], hence,π t must be part of the information state. Below, we provide an alternative explanation (from the decision making point of view) as to whyπ t must be part of the information state. Since each agent's strategy is privately selected in the dynamic game, an agent, say agent n, may want to deviate at time t to a strategy that is different from the one in equilibrium. To decide whether or not to deviate, agent n needs to know how other agents will react/respond to his deviation, by predicting the CIB belief π t+1 at time t + 1 resulting from his deviation. Since π t+1 depends on both π t andπ t , agent n needs to include both beliefs as part of his information state if he wants to evaluate the effect of possible deviations.
V. EXAMPLE: MULTIPLE ACCESS BROADCAST GAME
In this section, we illustrate the sequential decomposition developed in Section IV with an example of a two-agent multiple access broadcast system.
Consider a multiple access broadcast game where two agents, indexed by N = {1, 2}, share a common collision channel over time horizon T . At time t, W n t ∈ {0, 1} packets arrive at each agent n ∈ N according to independent Bernoulli processes with P(W 1 t = 1) = P(W 2 t = 1) = p = 0.5. Each agent can only store one packet in his local buffer/queue. Let X n t ∈ X n t = {0, 1} denote the queue length (number of packets) of agent n at the beginning of t. If a packet arrives at agent n when his queue is empty, the packet is stored in agent n's buffer; otherwise, the packet is dropped, and agent n incurs a dropping cost of c = 2 units.
At each time t, agent n can transmit A n t ∈ A n t = {0, 1} packets through the shared channel. If X n t = 0 then A n t = 0 always. If only one agent transmits, the transmission is successful and the transmitted packet is removed from the queue. If both agents transmit simultaneously, a collision occurs and both collided packets remain in their queues. We assume that any packet arriving at time t, t ∈ T , can be transmitted after t. Then, the queue length processes have the following dynamics. For n = 1, 2
Assume that agents' transmission results at t are broadcast at the end of time t. Then agent n's transmission decision A n t at time t is made based on his history of observation H n t = (X n 1:t , A 1:t−1 ) that consists of his local queue lengths and all previous transmissions from both agents.
Suppose each agent gets a unit reward at t if there is a successful transmission at t. Then, agent n's utility at time t is the reward minus the (expected) dropping cost given by
where x ⊕ y denotes the binary XOR operator, and n ∈ N . The multiple access broadcast game described above is an instance of the general dynamic model described in Section II. In the following, we use Algorithm 1 developed in Section IV to compute a CIB-PBE of this multiple access broadcast game for two time periods, i.e. T = {1, 2}.
Before applying Algorithm 1, we note some special features of this multiple access broadcast game. First, there is no C t , Y t in this multiple access broadcast game. Second, since the private state X n t can take only values in X n t = {0, 1}, any CIB belief in Δ(X n t ) can be described by a number π n t ∈ [0, 1] for all n = 1, 2, t = 1, 2. Furthermore, given any realization b t = (π t ,π t ) ∈ B t , any CIB strategy λ n t (x n t , b t ), x n t ∈ {0, 1}, of agent n can be characterized by a number β
. This is because A n t is binary, and λ n t (0, b t )(1) = 0 because no packet can be transmitted from an empty queue.
We now use Algorithm 1 to sequentially compute a CIB-PBE of the multiple access broadcast game.
Construction of the stage game at t = 2: Construction of the stage game at t = 2
At t = 2, for any b 2 = (π 2 ,π 2 ) ∈ B 2 , we construct the stage game G 2 (b 2 ) which is a Bayesian finite game (no need to consider a CIB update function because this is the last stage).
Computation of BNE at t = 2: Using standard techniques for static games, we obtain a BNE of where c * := (1 + cp)/(2 + cp). Then we obtain a CIB strategy λ * n
Construction of the stage game at t = 1: At t = 1, for any b 1 = (π 1 ,π 1 ) ∈ B 1 and a CIB update function ψ 1 , we construct the stage game G 1 (V 2 , ψ 1 , b 1 ) such that each player n, n = 1, 2, has utility
Computation of BNE and belief update function at t = 1: When the players use CIB strategies λ 1 characterized by (27) and (29), we obtain a CIB update function ψ 1 , given below, that is consistent with λ 1 (we select ψ n 1 (a 1 , b 1 ) =ψ n 1 (a 1 ,π 1 ) when the denominator of (27) is zero).
Substituting (49) into (48), we have the utilities of the two players in game G 1 (V 2 , ψ 1 , b 1 ). We numerically compute a BNE of
The values of β * 1 1 (π 1 ) and β * 2 1 (π 1 ) are shown in Fig. 1 Then, we obtain a CIB strategy λ * n
CIB-PBE and agents' expected utilities: From the above computation at t = 1, 2, we obtain a CIB-PBE (λ * , ψ * ), where
. Using (48), we numerically compute the value functions V
The results are shown in Fig. 2 . These value functions give agent 1's (conditional) expected utilities in the CIB-PBE (λ * , ψ * ). Agent 2's expected utilities can be computed in a similar way.
Remark 3 : The results show that agents' beliefs depend on their strategies [see (49)]. Therefore, there is signaling in this multiple access broadcast game. Moreover, the value functions are discontinuous in the agents' beliefs (see (46) and (47) for time t = 2, and Fig. 2 for time t = 1) . The presence of signaling together with the discontinuity of value functions make the agents' utilities discontinuous in their (behavioral) strategies.
VI. EXISTENCE OF COMMON INFORMATION BASED PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA
We prove the existence of a CIB-PBE for a subclass of the dynamic games described in Section II. This subclass includes dynamic games with uncontrolled dynamics and no private values. No private values simply means that each agent's private information X n t is payoff irrelevant to himself, but possibly payoff relevant to the other agents. The classic cheap-talk game [1] and the problem considered in [29] are examples of this subclass. We conjecture that there always exists a CIB-PBE for the general model described in Section II. We discuss this conjecture and elaborate more on the difficulty of establishing the existence proof for the general model of Section II at the end of this section.
To proceed formally, let Game M denote a dynamic game with uncontrolled dynamics, no private values, finite action spaces A n t , n ∈ N , t ∈ T , and (possibly) sequential moves. Let T := {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t K } ⊂ T denote the set of time instants in which the system evolves according to the following uncontrolled dynamics:
At t k < t ≤ t k+1 agents make decisions sequentially in t k+1 − t k epochs. We assume that the order according to which the agents take decisions is known a priori. Furthermore, agents observe the other agents' decisions in previous epochs; this fact is captured by including/appending previous actions in the common state C t as follows:
The agents have a common observation Y t k at each time t k ∈ T when the system evolves. The observations Y n t , n ∈ N , t ∈ T are described by
Agent n, n ∈ N has instantaneous utility
for time t, t ∈ T . Thus, each agent n ∈ N has no private values, hence his private information X n t is payoff irrelevant. From the above description, it is evident that Game M is indeed a subclass of the class of dynamic games described by the model of Section II. The dynamic oligopoly game presented in [29] is an instance of Game M.
The main result of this section is stated in the theorem below and asserts the existence of a CIB-PBE in Game M.
Theorem 2: Game M described in this section has a CIB-PBE which is a solution to the dynamic program defined by (39)-(42) in Theorem 1.
The proof of Theorem 2 is constructive. We construct an equilibrium for Game M in which agents use non-private strategies and have signaling-free beliefs which are consistent with the non-private strategy profile.
There are three reasons why Game M has a CIB-PBE with non-private strategies. First, the instantaneous utility U n t = φ n t (C t , X −n t , A t ) of agent n, n ∈ N does not depend on his private information. Therefore, the agent's best response is the same for all realizations of his private information, and a private strategy doest not provide any advantage in terms of higher instantaneous utility. Second, the system dynamics are strategy independent. Therefore, an agent cannot affect the evolution of the system by using a strategy that depends on his private information about the state of the system. Third, any private strategy does not provide any advantage to an agent in terms of his utility if it can not affect other agents' decisions, and this is the case when all agents use the signaling-free beliefs.
As we showed before, the CIB-PBE introduced in this paper are PBE. It is known that for finite dynamic games there always exists one sequential equilibrium, and therefore one PBE [1] , [2] . The proof of existence of sequential equilibria is indirect; it is done by showing the existence of a trembling hand equilibrium [1] , [2] which is also a sequential equilibrium. The proof of existence of trembling hand equilibrium follows the standard argument in game theory. It uses a suitable fixed point theorem to show the existence of a trembling equilibrium in an equivalent agent-based model representation [1] , [2] .
There are some technical difficulties in establishing the existence of a CIB-PBE for the general game model considered in this paper. The standard argument in using fixed point theorems is applicable to finite games where the expected utilities are continuous in the agent's mixed strategies. In each stage game arising in the sequential decomposition, say the game at stage t, agent n's expected utility (see (34)) depends on the functions {V n t+1 , n ∈ N }. However, the function V n t+1 is not always continuous in the strategies of agent n. (see Remark 3 for the multiple access broadcast game in Section V and the example in [29] ). Therefore, the standard argument for establishing the existence of an equilibrium fails for our general model. Even though we can not prove the existence of a CIB-PBE equilibrium, we conjecture that there always exists a CIB-PBE for the general dynamic game described in this paper.
We note that for the problem formulated in Section II, {X t t , C t , Π t ,Π t }, t ∈ T , are sufficient statistics from the decision making point of view (i.e. control theory). This makes a CIB strategy a more natural strategy choice for an agent, and consequently, a CIB-PBE is a more plausible equilibrium to arise in practice. However, this does not imply that from the game theory point of view, at all equilibria agents' best responses can be generated using only {X t t , C t , Π t ,Π t }. In a game problem, agents can incorporate a payoff irrelevant information in their strategy choice as a coordination instrument. For example, consider the classic repeated prisoner's dilemma game. In this game, agents can use previous outcomes of the game, that are payoff irrelevant, to sustain a punishment mechanism that results in additional equilibria beyond the repetition of the stage-game equilibrium [9] . The indirect proof for existence of sequential equilibria and PBE (described above) allows for this type of equilibria that depend on payoff irrelevant information for coordination. Nevertheless, we conjecture that there always exists an equilibrium for the game described in Section II that depends only on {X t t , C t , Π t ,Π t }. The example of the dynamic multiple access broadcast game in Section V is an instance of a dynamic game that does not belong to the subclass of Game M, but has a CIB-PBE. To make our conjecture more precise, we provide below a sufficient condition for the existence of a CIB-PBE.
Let (g * , μ * ) be a strategy profile that is a PBE. Consider the following condition.
Condition C: For all h 
If Condition C is satisfied for a PBE (g * , μ * ), then a CIB-PBE exists. We conjecture that Condition C is satisfied for at least a PBE in the dynamic games considered in this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information. We identified game environments that can lead to signaling in dynamic games. We considered a state space model to analyze dynamic games with private states and controlled Markovian dynamics. We provided a comparison between our state space model and classic extensive game form model. We showed that the two models are equivalent as long as one ensures that the belief system associated with the state space model is compatible with the system dynamics. To ensure the compatibility, we introduced the signaling-free belief system. Using the signaling-free belief system, we provided a formal definition of PBE in our state space model. We used the common information among agents to define a subset of PBE called CIB-PBE that consists of a pair of CIB strategy profile and CIB update rule. We obtained a sequential decomposition for dynamic games that leads to a backward induction algorithm for the computation of CIB-PBE even when signaling occurs. We illustrated our results with an example of multiple access broadcast game. We proved the existence of CIB-PBE for a subclass of dynamic games and provided a sufficient condition for the existence of CIB-PBE for the general class of dynamic games considered in this paper.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1:
The lemma is proved by induction. Since the initial states are independent, (18) holds at t = 1. Suppose the lemma is true at time t. Given any h c t+1 = {c 1:t+1 , y 1:t , a 1:t } at t + 1, we have from Bayes' rulê π t+1 (x t+1 ) = P (A 1:t =a 1:t ) (x t+1 |y 1:t ) = P (A 1:t =a 1:t ) (x t+1 , y t |y 1:t−1 )
x t+1 ∈X t+1 P (A 1:t =a 1:t ) x t+1 , y t |y 1:t−1 .
The numerator in (56) can be further expressed by 
